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  series of constitutional amendments met the approval of 58% of Turkey’s electorate in the 
September 12
th referendum. The 26 amendments cover a wide variety of issues ranging from the 
granting of positive discrimination to women to the creation of an ombudsman office, from the right 
to information to the reform of the judicial system. The approval of the package was in general received 
positively by the EU,
1 while it has been strongly contested within Turkey.  
Regarding its overall political effects, firstly the referendum testifies to the continuing resilience of the 
power of Mr Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the relative weakness of the opposition in 
the wake of the 2011 general elections. Secondly, it raised questions of legitimacy, particularly in the 
Southeast region where a sizeable majority of the Kurdish electorate did not turn up at the ballot box 
following the boycott policy of the Kurdish nationalist Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). This has once 
again highlighted the significance of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as a political actor in the region 
and the urgency of finding a political solution through dialogue between the government and the BDP. 
Thirdly, the referendum has shown that the opposition can no longer hope to win elections by a strategy that 
solely rests on AKP bashing. In the case of the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), 
fundamental changes are required in the its position on religious freedoms, commitment to EU membership 
(despite the low credibility and expectations) and the Kurdish issue (including the prospects of 
decentralisation) for it to be a serious contender to AKP rule.  
The constitutional package can be considered as a step forward towards the drafting of a new civilian 
constitution, which is needed for a rapidly changing, vibrant and dynamic Turkey that can no longer operate 
within the restrictive confines of its ‘coup’ constitution. Looking at the new package in depth, these include 
measures such as the article that will now allow the Supreme Military Council’s decisions on the expulsion 
of military officers to be taken to court; strengthening of children’s rights; strengthening the right to 
information; lifting the judicial impunity of the perpetrators of the 1980 coup, the creation of an ombudsman 
office to investigate complaints against state institutions; and establishing a Secretariat for the High Council 
of Judges and Public Prosecutors separate from the Ministry of Justice. Nevertheless, the referendum was 
bitterly fought between the governing AKP and the opposition parties – CHP and the ultra nationalist MHP 
(Nationalist Movement Party) – both of which launched a ‘no’ campaign. Some 42% of the population voted 
                                                      
1 In fact, some of the amendments were already suggested in a 2004 CEPS study conducted by the author with Fuat 
Keyman on the democratic reforms that Turkey needs to undertake to achieve a consolidated democracy on its path 
towards the EU. See European Integration and the Transformation of Turkish Democracy, Senem Aydın and E. Fuat 
Keyman, CEPS EU-Turkey Working Paper No. 2, August 2004. 
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against it and it still continues to be subject to debate and criticism in some segments of the mainstream 
media. So what is all the fuss about?  
Some of the debate centres on the ‘insufficiency’ and/or the ‘hollowness’ of the reforms. For example, it is 
expected that the perpetrators of the 1980 military coup will not in fact be tried since the statute of 
limitations has been exceeded. Similarly, while the ombudsman institution can be considered an important 
measure in combating corruption in public administration, there are question marks as to whether an 
ombudsman elected by a simple plurality of votes in the Parliament (thus, under the current conditions, by 
the governing party that is itself responsible from the administration) can undertake this task in a fair, non-
partisan manner.  
Most of the dispute, however, concentrates on two amendments that concern the composition of the 
Constitutional Court and the High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors, the latter of which determines 
the career paths of judges and prosecutors through appointments, transfers, promotions, reprimands and other 
mechanisms. The constitutional package increases the number of the members of the Constitutional Court 
from 11 to 17 and reduces their tenure from 25 to 12 years. The reduction of tenure is particularly important 
to prevent the entrenchment of certain ‘cliques’ within the highest court. Under the former constitutional 
arrangement, all of these members were selected and appointed by the President. The new amendments 
retain the right of the President to select 14 of these members (10 to be appointed indirectly from the 
candidates proposed by the High Courts as well as the High Education Board (YOK), whose composition is 
already determined by the President, and 4 to be appointed directly from a pool of lawyers, high-level state 
executives, first-class judges and public prosecutors and Constitutional Court rapporteurs). The main 
novelty, however, consists of the right of the Parliament to select and appoint three members by a simple 
plurality of votes. This amendment can be interpreted in two different ways. On the one hand, it can be 
argued that the highest court in Turkey will now be more democratic and thus more responsive to the 
demands of society since the background of its members will now be more diversified. Another reading 
suggests that the new arrangement may allow for more politicisation of the Constitutional Court in a system 
where the election of the President by the public (a measure previously introduced by the AKP) in a 
polarised society such as Turkey may ultimately lead to a dangerous dominance of the executive in the 
Constitutional Court. This is feared to be the case especially in situations where the President comes from the 
same political family as a single party in government (as exists today).   
The second controversial amendment changes the composition of the High Council. It increases the number 
of its members from 7 to 22, which was largely necessary given the size of the Turkish judiciary, and widens 
its composition from the representatives of the High Courts to legal scholars, lawyers and representatives of 
the low courts, elected mostly by the judiciary itself. It can be argued that this creates a Council that is much 
more representative of the judicial sphere than the previous one. The fact that the judges and the public 
prosecutors will also be evaluated by inspectors appointed by the Council and not by the Ministry as before 
remedies an important source of judicial dependence on the executive, which was much criticised in the past 
by the EU and scholars alike. Yet, as before, one also needs to look closely at the other side of the coin to 
understand the intense debates over this amendment. The main problem here lies with the role of the 
Minister of Justice in the Council. One crucial element of the 1982 constitution concerns the presence of the 
Minister in the High Council. The new amendment abolishes the right of the Minister to attend the meetings. 
Yet, he is still endowed with the task of ‘representing’ and ‘administering’ the Council, he can still decide on 
the Secretary General, he still has the ultimate approval concerning the inspections against judges and 
prosecutors and his Undersecretary will still be present in the Council meetings. Perhaps more importantly, 
the way in which decisions will be taken in the Council is still unknown and left to regulations that will be 
passed by the government. They will be crucial, particularly in determining the relationship between the 
Minister and other members of the Council.   
From a strictly institutionalist point of view, the above discussion suggests that some of the new changes can 
be considered improvements over the former state of affairs. Yet it can also be observed that the ‘negative 
interpretations’ are closely concerned with the degrees of mistrust felt towards the government. It is the 
‘mistrust’ that breeds concerns over the appointments of the President to the Constitutional Court or the 
Minister’s continued future role in the Council. A non-negligible percentage of the Turkish population does 
not trust the government’s normative commitment to democratisation. This lack of trust is not completely 
unfounded. The government’s track record in democratisation feeds into these perceptions. One blatant 
example concerns the way in which the government has chosen to operate with one of the most infamous 
remnants of the coup, namely the High Education Board (YOK), instead of abolishing it. In a similar vein, Constitutional Referendum in Turkey: What Next? | 3 
the way in which the government went against the Venice Commission’s decisions by compiling all the 
amendments in one vote (where internal coherence of the package is contested) further boosted the view that 
this is in fact a referendum on the restructuring of the judiciary, whereas most of the other amendments are 
cosmetic changes geared to allure the electorate.   
It is in fact the case that the Turkish judiciary has never been sufficiently independent or impartial. The 
hegemony of the Kemalist legacy allowed for little diversity and offered only limited ground for the 
expansion of fundamental freedoms. Yet, what is now feared is the replacement of one form of ideological 
favouritism with simply another that rests on the power of the executive. Whether this scenario materialises 
depends on implementation as the only means through which intentions will be revealed. Hence, while the 
amendments may be considered ‘positive’ on paper, much will depend on the practice as well as the next 
reform steps that the government will take. It is yet to be seen whether the government will start working on 
a new civilian constitution, or insist on selective reforms aimed at further reinforcing its power, such the 
introduction of a Presidential system (as hinted at by the Prime Minister in the immediate aftermath of the 
referendum). Reforms of the latter type could potentially strengthen authoritarian tendencies in a country 
already marked by strong fault lines. 